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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN H. CHASE,
Plaintiff and Respondent
Case No. 7363

vs.
KIRBY S. DAWSON and ELINOR
W. DAWSON, his wife,
Defendants arnd .Ap(pellants

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The respondent feels that the Statement of the Case
of the appellants is vague, uncertain, and to a certain
extent confusing. Also, the appellants, in their index,
have set up the following points:
''Denial by the court of motion to strike
from the complaint matter not alleged in the
notice of lien.
''Overruling demurrer to complaint.
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''Overruling objection to Exhibit A, the notice of lien sued upon.
''Making findings of fact not alleged in the
notice of lien.
''Making findings of fact not alleged in the
complaint or the notice of lien. ·
''That the judgment is against law.
and gave no page number which would enable the res'P'ondent or court to correlate definitely the points with the
argument.
On page 1, they set out what they claim are the
three fundamental questions in the case, a.s follows:
1. 'The sufficiency of the notice of claim of
lien relied upon by the respondent.
2. The right of the claimant's assignee to
change, amend, add to or enlarge ·such
claim by allegations in his complaint.
3. To further change, amend, add to or enlarge such claim by either evidence, or the
findings of fact, after the case is closed
and submitted.''
So, the writ'er feels that it is absolutely necessary
to examine this case and determine just exactly the point
or points to be argued.
RESPONDENT'S: !S.TATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 14, 1948, the plaintiff, as the assignee
of one George 0. Chase, filed his complaint in the DisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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trict Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 1-3),
to foreclose a mechanic's lien on defendants' property.
The complaint is set out in appellants' brief on pages
2 and 3. The defendants then demurred generally to
plaintiff's complaint (R. 7), and filed their notice of intention to strike (R. 8) from Paragraph 2 of plaintiff's
complaint that which is here italicized:
"That on or about the 21st day of October,
1947, at Salt Lake City, Utah, George 0. Chase,
doing business as the Chase Lumber and Hardware Company, ·entered into an oral agreement
with one J. S. Livingston, .a contractor employed
by the defendants, whereby it was agreed that
the said George 0. Chase furnish materials for a
home for defendants located on the land hereinafter described, and that the agreed price of
$208.93 would be paid for said materials.''
That on December 7, 1948, the Honorable Roald A.
Hogenson, one of the judges of the District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered his order overruling defendants' demurrer and denying their motion
to strike (R. 10). The defendants, on December 21, 1948,
filed their answer to plaintiff's complaint ( R. 13). Their
answer admitted that plaintiff and defendants were residents of Salt Lake County, Utah, and defendants. owned
the premises referred to in the complaint. They admitted
the filing of a pretended notice of lien, but denied that
the instrument or copy of the lien attached to the complaint was a true copy of the record filed by George 0.
Chase. For lack of information, they denied all other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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allegations in the complaint and asked for $25.00 attorney's fees.
On February· 14, 1949, the pre-trial was had before
the Honorable J. Allan Crockett, and the court at that
time received in evidence the photostatic copy of the
notice of lien, which is marked Exhibit ''A.''
The trial of the cause came on before the Honorable
J. Allan Crockett on the 23rd day of February, 1949, at
which time the defendants' attorney objected to the introduction of the photostatic copy of the lien upon the
grounds as follows:
"MR. WIGHT: We will object to it on the
grounds that it is incompetent, that it isn't the
notice of lien copied and attached to the complaint, that it is wholly insufficient for the purpose of creating a lien, and, in particular, it
doesn't state whether the claimant was the original or a sub-contractor, and, if a sub-contractor,
the name of the original contractor with whom he
made his contract.
"It doesn't state the nature of the materials
furnished or to whom they were delivered or
that they were to be used in the construction,
alteration, addition to or repair of building, structure, or addition to a building structure or im'
provement upon the land owned' by the defendants
against which the lien is sought to be imprest ·
.
·d oesn ' t state t h e nature of the Improvement
nor'
the terms and conditions of the contract under
which the materials wer;e furnished.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
''Now, if your Honor please, this is going
to be the question in the case, and about the only
question in the case.
"THE COURT: Well, now, let's do .this
thing, shall we~ Let's get all the evidence in,
then discuss the law of the case, shall we~
"MR WIGHT: I don't know, so far aa we
are concerned, we're not disputing the delivery
of the materials to the place ; we're not disputing
the fact that the-there was a notice of lien filed,
and that the notice is the photostatic copy-that
is, the photostatic copy is a true copy of the recorded notice, and, I take it, that you won't dispute that the Dawsons paid Mr. Livingston in
full for the house." (R. 34-35)
That thereafter Exhibit "B," being the delivery
sheets of the materials used in defendants' home, was
introduced in evidence, and Exhibit '' C, '' the ledger
sheet of George 0. Chase for J. S. Livingston, was introduced in evidence, and Exhibit '' D, '' the delivery sheets
of certain deliveries made by Chase to Livingston which
were not claimed to be an obligation of the Dawsons.
The defendants admitted the assignment of George 0.
Chase to John Chase (R. 38).
Later the following took place:
'' MR McCARTY: Now, will you admit that
the material was used in the house, was delivered
up there~
"THE COURT: He did state, I think, you
don't dispute the delivery to the Dawsons ~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"MR. WIGHT: We don't dispute it, but
we want the evidence to go in subject to the objection we ha:ve already made.
"MR. McCARTY: I understand that.
"THE COURT: You are not disputing it,
and he repr•esented it to be a fact, we will take
it to be a fact that the materials referred to were
delivered upon the Dawson house and used therein.
"MR. McCARTY: Yes; well, I guess that
is our case.
''MR. WIGHT : We rest, your Honor please.
''MR. McCARTY: We rest, and I'll excuse
both of my witnesses and excuse my other witness." (R. 39)
The court again stated to the defendants' attorney
that he wished to 'P'llt it in the record that if the notice
of lien, a copy of which is Exhibit ''A,'' is sufficient in
law, the plaintiff is entitled to recover as prayed in
the complaint. Defendants' attorney stated he would
not like to make a stipulation that way, he did not dispute the fact that the materials were delivered and that
the notice of lien was filed in the form shown by Exhibit "A." Defendants' attorney did not come out directly for some time and say that the only issue in the
case was the sufficiency of the lien, and finally the
court stated as follows :
''THE COU_R.T: So that, in all respects, except for the suff1mency of the lien, you are satisfied, and that-I will state it as I did before-and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I don't want to be unfair with you-if that is
unfair with you, correct me-that you rest your
defense solely upon the sufficiency of the lien~
"MR. WIGHT: Yes.
"THE COURT: And, if it is sufficient in
law, the plaintiff should recover what he prayed
for in his complaint~
"MR. WIGHT: I don't want to go that far.
''THE COURT: Well, all right.
"~IR. WIGHT: I will stipulate that thethat we rest our defense solely upon the sufficiency of the lien." (R. 42)

The court thereupon overruled defendants' objection to the admission of the lien, Exhibit ''A,'' in evidence and admitted the same in evidence. That thereafter, on the 30th day of March, 1949, the Honorable J.
Allen Crockett entered judgment in favor of plaintiff
and against the defendants as prayed. Findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment were submitted to the
court on the 5th day of April, 1949, by the plaintiff, and
that thereafter the defendants filed their objections to
the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment (R. 22'). Among the obj.ections was that there
was no evidence introduced in regard to attorney's fees.
The hearing on the objections came up before the Honor8.ble J. Allen Crockett on the 23rd day of April, 1949,
at which time the court reopened on his own motion the
case to allow evidence as to attorney's fees, at which time
the plaintiff's attorney called some witnesses, but at
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that time the defendants, through their counsel, sti~
ulated that $25.00 would be a reasonable attorney's fee
for either counsel in the matter, and thereupon the court
signed the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment.
POINTS TO BE ARGUED

The respondent feels that there is one sole point to
be considered, that is :

WAS THE NOTICE OF LIEN, EXHIBIT "A,"
SUFFICIENT TO SATI:S1FY THE STATUTE~
The respondent will break down his argument into
two subdivisions :
a. The lien law is remedial, and substantial compliance therewith is sufficient.
b. The notice of lien, Exhibit ''A,'' substantially
complied with the statute.

ARGUMENT
A. THE LIEN LAW IS REMEDIAL, AND SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE THEREWITH IS SUF:FICIENT.

The mechanic's lien law proceeds upon the theory
that the laborer and the materialman have an equitable
right to follow their labor and materials into the building of which they have become a component part, and to
have a lien on it because the building contains in it such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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labor and material. The lien claimant is, of course, entitled to receive compensation for his labor and materials
from those contractually obligated to him, a right which
is in no way dependant upon a lien or mechanic's lien
law, and the mechanic's lien law has in addition superadded a new security. As the lien is of purely statutory
origin, the statute must be examined to determine both
the right and mode by which it can be secured. While
this is true, the lien is favored; the law relating thereto
is remedial in character, and should be liberally construed with a view to effect its object and promote justice. The courts will not give the law a construction
tending by its technicality to fritter away, impair or
destroy the benign objects arrived at in its adoption.
The liberal construction is favored by the courts of
most States, and the old rule of strict compliance with
the statute is favored by only a few courts. The appellants have picked out a few of the strict compliance
cases.
The notice of lien, as in this case, is usually prepared
by an artisan or materialman, who is not skilled in the
niceties of law or the use of technical phrases. The
courts have realized this and have been loath to deny
relief because of some slight imperfection, and the courts
have regard to substance rather than form.
Volume 36 America;n Jurisprude,nce, page 91, Section 126, ''Mechanic's Liens'':
''In order to be sufficient, the lien notice
must comply with the statutory provisions. HowSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ever, the pertinent facts in such not~c~ need not be
set forth or stated with the definiteness of a
pleading; a substantial compliance, in good_ fait~,
with the requirements of the statutes being In
these respects sufficient.''
That is the general statement of the law, both by
the text book writers and the courts.
The case of Ford v. Sp,ringer Land Association, 41
P. 541 (New Mexico, 1895), is one of the early western
cases that held that the mechanic's lien law, in view
of the equitable character of the statute, should be liberally construed, but cannot by construction be extended
to cases not provided for by statute. The case also holds
that the notice of claim of lien, being the foundation of
the action, must contain all the essential requirements
of the statute, and a failure or omission on the part of the
person claiming the lien of any of the substantial requisites of the ·statute is fatal and will defeat the action.
This case was aT>pealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and may be found in 168 U.S. 513, 18
Sup. Ct. 170, 42 U.S. (L. Ed.) 562. T~e Supreme Court
in that case held that substantial compliance, in good
faith, with the requirement of the mechanic's lien laws
is sufficient, and the test of such compliance is to be
found in the statute embracing such laws.
It was held in Salt Lake Hardware Co. v. ChaiJrmarn
Min. etc. Co., 137 Fed. 632:
"It is true that the right to enforce a mechanic's lien depends upon a compliance with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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requirements of the statute. Technical accuracy,
however, is not required. The courts hold that
a substantial compliance is all that is essential."
Bloom on Laws of ill echanic' s Liens, on page 304,
states:
"It is not required therefore that the claim
shall contain a statement of all the facts essential
to establish the lien; whether, for instance, the
facts being truly stated, as required by the statute,
the person in possession of the property or the
person by whom the laborer was employed had
authority to bind the owner, as agent, is a matter
for allegation and proof at .the trial.''
Sec. 371. ''A substantial compliance with the
statute as to the claim of lien is all that is required. It has been said that the provisions of
.the code relative thereto are to be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to
promote justice and .substance rather than form
is to be regarded. In this connection the court
said, 'We are certainly not disposed to defeat
the lien by a nice criticism of the language in
which the lien is set forth.' ''
Citing: Wood v. Wiede, 46 Cal. 637. Malone v. Big
Flat C. M. Co., 76 Cal. 578, 18 P. 772. Oast,agnetto v.
Coppertown M. & 8. Co., 146 Cal. 329,80 P. 74.

Trout v. Siegel, et ~al. (Calif., 1927), 262 P. 320,
quotes with approval from Wagner v. R(l;nSen, (Calif.)
37 P. 195:
'' 'The purpose of the record and statement
must be to inform the owner, in case of a conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tractor and laborers rendering service under such
contract as to the extent and nature of a lienor's
claim, to facilitate investigation as to its
merits.' ''
'See also: D~ake Lumber Co. v. Ditnrdquist, et al.
(Ore., July 2, 1946), 170 P. (2d) 712.
In the case of Interooiastal Lumber Distributors v.
D·eriarn (Pennsylvania, 1935), 178 Atl. 350, it is stated:
''Adherence to the terms of the statute
is indispensable, but the rule must not be pushed
into such niceties as serve but to perplex and embarrass a remedy intended to be simple and summary, without in fact adding anything to the
security of the parties having an interest in the
building sought to be encumbered. We must no.t
be hyper-critical when scanning this species of
lien and estimating its sufficiency. Such a practice must necessarily defeat a very large majority of them; a result not to be desired where they
furnish sufficient data to enable the parties subject to them to ascertain all that is essential for
them to know. It would be idle to suggest that
the owner of this building, from an inspection of
the paper filed, would not know the person alleged
to be the contractor."
See also: 57 C.J.S., page 672.
Utah is committed to the same liberal construction.
Justice Frick, in Park Oity Meat Co. v. Oomstoek Silver
Mining Co., 36 U. 145, 103 P. 254, states:
''The more modern decisions however are to
the eff·ect that mechanic's lien 'statutes 'should
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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receive a fair and reasonable, if not a liberal, construction, with a view to preserving their spirit
and effectuating their purposes.''
Justice Frick again, in the case of Eccles v. Martin,
31 U. 2-U, 87 P. 713, quotes from 20 Am. & Eng. Ency.
Law, on page 276, and says:
''A lien once acquired by labor performed on
a building with the consent of the owner should
not, however, be defeated by technicalities, when
no rights of others are infringed, and no express
command of the statute is disregarded.''
Another Utah case, Elw·ell v. Morros, 28 U. 278, 78
P. 605, states:
''The weight of authority is to the effect that
the well-established :rule that remedial provisions
of the statutes are to be liberally construed ap\...
plies to, and should be followed in, proceedings to
foreclose mechanic's liens."
See also: Rockel on Mechanic's Liens, page 258,
Sec. 100, and page 284. Brubaker v. Bennett, 19 U. 401,
57 P. 170.
The case of Morrison-Merrill v. Willard, 17 U. 306,
53 P. 833, cited by appellants on page 12 of their brief,
also holds that substantial compliance with the statute
is all that is necessary.
There ia no question whatsoever but that Utah has
adopted the liberal construction of the lien law.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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B. THE NOTICE OF LIEN, EXHIBIT "A," SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTE.

To consider this properly, we must look to the statute and to the lien, Exhibit ''A,'' itself.
Section 52-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943:
''Contractors, subcontractors and all persons
performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to
be used in, the con8truction or alteration of, or
addition to, or repair of, any building, structure
or improvement upon land * * * shall have a
lien upon the property upon or concerning which
they have rendered service, performed labor o_r
furnished materials, for the value of the s·ervice
rendered, labor performed or materials furnished
by each respectively, whether at the instance of
the owner or of any other person acting by his
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise."
Section 52-1-7, Ut.a.h Code Annotated, 1943:
"Every original contractor within eighty days
after the completion of his contract, and every
per8on exce'{lt the original contractor claiming
the benefit of this chapter within sixty days after
furnishing the last material or performing the
last labor for any building, improvement or structure, or for any alteration, addition to or repair
thereof, or performance of any labor in, or furnishing any materials for, any mine or mining
claim, must file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property or
some .P~trt there~f, is situated a claim in writing,
containing a notice of intention to hold and claim
a lien, and a statement of his demand after deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ducting all just credits and offsets, with the name
of the owner, if known, and also the name of the
person by whom he was employed or to whom he
furnished the material, with a statement of the
ter1ns, time given and eonditions of his contract,
specifying the time when the first and last labor
was performed, or the first and last material was
furnished, and also a description of the property
to be charged with the lien, sufficient for identification, which claim must be verified by the oath
of himself or of .some other person.''
The notice of lien, Exhibit ''A,'' is set out below.
It appeared on a printed form. The portions filled in by
the lien claimant are italicized.
NOTICE OF LIEN
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned,
George 0. Chase, ·dba Chase Lumber and Hardwa;re doing business as ---------------- and residing at
Salt Lake City County of Salt Lake State of Utah,
hereby claims and intends to hold and claim a lien
upon that certain land and premises, owned and
reputed to be owned by Kirby S. Dawson 1and
Elinor W. Dawson, his wife, and situate, lying
and being in Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, described as follows, to-wit: 1424
South 14th East Street, South 1f2 of Lot 23 and
North 1f2 of Lot 24, Block 6, LIBERTY HEIGHTS
to secure the payment of the sum of One Hundred Fifty Seven ~and 16/100 Dollars, owing to the
undersigned for material as a lumber ·and ha.rdware dealer in, on and about the house on said
land.
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That the said indebtedness accrued and the
undersigned furnished said materials to Kirby
8. Dawson, who was the owner and the reputed
owner of said premises as aforesai~, under a. ~tral
contract made between the said Ktrby 8. Lwtngston and the undersigned on the 21st day of Oc._
tober, 1947, by the terms of which the undersigned
did agree to deliver material to solid premises
and the said Kirby 8. Dawson did agree to pay
the undersigned therefor as follows, to-wit: Cash
and under which said contract the undersigned
did ddiver the first material on the 21st day of
October, 1947 and did deliver the last material
on the 24th day of Octobe.r, 1947 and on and between said last mentioned days, did deliver 1rUlrterial amounting to the sum of Two Hwndred
Eight and 93/100 Dollars, which was the reasonable value thereof, and on which the following
payments have been made to-wit: $51.77 leaving
a balance owing to the undersigned of $i57.16
Dollars after deducting all just credits and offsets,
and for which demand the undersigned holds and
claims a lien by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, of Title 52, of the Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933.
(s) GEORGE 0. CHASE
(verified on reverse side)
The respondent claims, on page 9 of his brief, that
the notice of lien omitted to state five essential averments:
1. The nature and amount of the material furnished by the claiment.

2.

The use to which they were to be applied.
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3. To whom they were delivered.
4. The terms, time given and conditions of the
contract under which they were furnished.
5. That Livingston, with whom he made his contract, was acting as agent, contractor or otherwise authorized by appellants to make such contract in their behalf.
Taking them in order:
1. The notice of lien, Exhibit ''A,'' states that it
was for material a.s a lumber and hardware dealer. The
appellants did not state wherein those words were insufficient. Does the lien have to set out with particularity
the number of shingles furnished, as in this case, or the
number of buckets of tar f The lien claimant furnished
material as a hardware and lumber dealer, which went
into the house on the property on which he claimed the
lien. It was not incumbent on the lien claimant in his
notice of lien to furnish an itemized list of each and every
article that was delivered. On some construction jobs a
lien would require hundreds of pages were such the ca:.se.

2. Appellants complain that we did not have in the
notice of lien the use to which they were to be applied.
I do not believe that there is a case, even in the States
which hold strict compliance necessary, that goes so
far that you have to state the use to which materials
were to be applied. It i.s sufficient if they are delivered
to the premises for that purpose, and the notice of lien
shows that it was for material in and about the house on
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said land. The proof, of course, in this case shows both
by stipulation of counsel and also by the delivery sheets,
Exhibit '' B '' that the material was delivered and ac' appellants, and it was admitted in evidence
cepted by the
that the material was used in the house ( R. 39). The
notice of lien, of course, must be taken in its entirety,
and the lien says that they are filing a lien to secure
the payment of money owing to the lien claimant for
material as a lumber and hardware dealer in and about
the house on said land. ·Then it goes on to say that the
indebtedness accrued and the lien claimant furnished
materials to Kirby S. Dawson, who was the owner of
said premises, under a contract made with Kirby S.
Livingston, and that the lien claimant did deliver the
material to said premises, and the appellant, Kirby S.
Dawson, agreed to pay cash, and the notice of lien goes
on to say when the first material and the last material
were delivered by the lien claimant. Taking the lien in
its entirety, it clearly shows that the material was delivered to the premises to be used in and about the house
thereon, and the respondent respectfully contends that
the hypercritical and baseless objections of appellants
on this point ·should be disregarded.
3. The appellants complain because the notice of
lien did not mention that the materials were delivered to
a certain person. The notice of lien sets out that they
furnished materials to the appellants and that the materials were delivered to the premises, and that the
appellant, Kirby S. Dawson, agreed to pay for them.
What could be clearer~ Suppose under a contract of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
this nature some one delivered the material to the premises and they were accepted by a stranger. Muot the
lien set out the stranger's name 1 Certainly not. In this
case, the proof, Exhibit '' B,'' showed that the materials
were delivered to the appellants.
4. The appellants complain that the notice of lien
did not set out the term, time given and conditions of
the contract under which the materials were furnished.
Then they quote an old case of Hooper v. Flood, 54 Cal.
218, wherein it is held that the otatement that the terms
of the contract "were and are cash" was insufficient.
The case referred to is poorly reasoned, and has never
been given consideration as a precedent. In Exhibit ''A,''
the notice says that by the terms of which the undersigned did agree to deliver material to said premises and
the said Kirby S. Dawson did agree to pay the undersigned therefor as follows, to-wit: "Cash." "Cash" is a
common word, and the term generally means that the
account shall be paid immediately upon delivery. It
is the antonym of "credit." The case cited by appellants was definitely overruled in its definition of 'cash'
by the case of Parrish v. Arne.rican Ry. Employees'

Corp., (Dist. Ct. of Appeals, Calif., 1927), 256 P. 590:
'' 'Cash' in its ordinary sense is an antonym
of 'credit' as generally understood and defined
by the courts.''
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Hartwig v. Rushifn.g (Ore., 1919), 182 P.177:

''Ordinarily the word 'cash' means ~oney,
but it is frequently used as a term meanmg the
opposite of credit."
See also : Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Vol. 6, page 246, '' Cash.''
5. The appellants further complain that it does
not set out that Livingston was acting as agent, contractor or otherwise authorized by appellants to make a
contract in their behalf. Considering Exhibit ''A,'' the
notice of lien, in its entirety, it c~rtainly does show that
Livingston had the authority. He made the contract and
Dawson agreed to pay for it. It would be ridiculous to
assume that a man would agree to pay for something
that he did not authorize. However, the law is also
against appellants' contention.
In the case of Da;vis-He.nderson Lumber Co. v. GoUschall et al., (Sup. Ct. Calif., 1889), 22 P. 860, on page
862, it says :
''There is nothing in the section or in any
other that requires the materialman to state in
his claim of lien what relationship the person
to whom he furnished the materials bore to the
owners.''
See also: Castagne.tto v. Coppertown M. & S. Co.,
146 Cal. 329, 80 P. 74. Ingersoll et a.l. v. Chaplin et al.,
(Calif., 1932) 15 P. (2) 790. Drake Lumber Co. v. Lindquist et a.l., (Ore., July 2, 1946) 170 P. (2) 712.
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Our statute does not require that authority to be
set out in the lien. In this case, the notice of lien certainly furnished the appellants sufficient data to enable
them to ascertain all that was essential for them to know.
In this case from beginning to end the aJ;>pellants have
sought to escape their just liability by endeavoring to
create trivial technicalities and by blandly stating that
the notice of lien lacked certain elements which on inspection proved to be there.
On page 9 of appellants' brief (I hope the court
has page 9 in its copies; it is lacking in one of the respondent's), the appellants quoted from Bloom's LO!W
of Mechanic's Liens, section 411 :
"Where a claim of lien is uncertain it will
be construed against the claimant.''
Upon an examination of this section and the cases cited,
it will be found that the case held that where a lien claimant claimed for materials or work furnished from about
July 1st, he could not go prior to that date in his proof
in the case. In other words, if in the instant case respondent had claimed ,about $150.00 as the amount due,
he could not have recovered a bit more than the $150.00.
This section does not mean that if there is an uncertainty in the claim for lien the lien will be declared invalid, but merely that the uncertainty will be decided
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fied the authority cited and quoted by appellants on page
10 of their brief, Jornes on niens, 3d edition, section 1391:
''The form of the notice or claim is immaterial, provided it complies substantially w?-th
all the requirements of the statute. Everythrng
"required by the .statute should be stated with
reasonableness and certainty of language.''
Thus, it will be seen upon a careful scrutiny of Exhibit" A," every technicality that appellant.3 are depending upon to defeat respondent's claim fades into nothingness. The notice of lien substantially complied with the
statute in every respect.
CONCLUSION

Two district court judges held that Exhibit ''A,''
the notice of lien, substantially complied with the statute
and was sufficient in law upon which to base respondent's
recovery. (R. 10 and 42) The appellants in this court
have failed in their brief to point out in any way wherein
the notice of lien was not in substantial compliance with
the statute. Even the authorities cited by the appellants
fail to sustain their position.
Therefore, respondent respectfully submits that the
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYS. McCARTY
Atto.rney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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